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Abstract
This paper argues that there was considerably more philosophy of action in moral theory 
before 1958 (when Anscombe complained of its lack under the banner ‘philosophy of 
psychology’) than there has been since. This is in part because Anscombe influenced the 
formation of ‘virtue theory’ as yet another position within normative ethics, and her work 
contributed to the fashioning of ‘moral psychology’ as an altogether distinct (and now 
increasingly empirical) branch of moral philosophy.
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Resum. Filosofia moral moderna abans i després d’Anscombe
Aquest article argumenta que hi havia considerablement més filosofia d’acció en teoria 
moral abans de 1958 (quan Anscombe es va queixar que en faltava sota el lema «filosofia 
de la psicologia») que la que hi ha hagut des de llavors. Això es deu en part al fet que 
Anscombe va influir en la formació de la «teoria de la virtut» com una posició més dins 
de l’ètica normativa, i el treball d’Anscombe va contribuir a la formació de la «psicologia 
moral» com una branca completament diferent (i ara cada vegada més empírica) de la 
filosofia moral.
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Prologue
This paper argues for the following three theses:
i) There was considerably more philosophy of action in moral theory before 
1958 (when Anscombe complained of its lack under the banner ‘philos-
ophy of psychology’) than there has been since. This is in part because
ii) Anscombe influenced the formation of ‘virtue theory’ as yet another posi-
tion within normative ethics, and
iii) Anscombe’s work contributed to the fashioning of ‘moral psychology’ as 
an altogether distinct (and now increasingly empirical) branch of moral 
philosophy.
None of (i-iii) were foreseen – let alone intended – by Anscombe, who 
would have been displeased by this state of affairs, already evident at the 
time of her death in early 2001. The tragic irony of ‘Modern Moral Philos-
ophy’ (henceforth MMP), then, is that in many ways the past century of 
ethical theory makes more sense read backwards. My somewhat program-
matic investigation into this predicament begins somewhere in the middle, 
with MMP, then proceeds to present what happened before and after in 
its light.
1. ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’
MMP remains as divisive today as it was when it was first published sixty 
years ago. Some hail it to be of huge philosophical and historical importance, 
not least by effectively giving birth to neo-Aristotelian Virtue Ethics as exem-
plified by Philippa Foot, Rosalind Hursthouse, Alasdair McIntyre, and John 
McDowell (Richter, 2011; Solomon, 2008: 110-111). Others present it as 
a dated or otherwise irritating text containing baffling and unsubstantiated 
claims, the deciphering of which is not worth the candle (e.g. Blackburn, 
2005). 
One recurring complaint has been that Anscombe is unfair in dismissing 
the ideas of dead white men with brief statements that contain more disrespect 
than they do argument. Bishop Butler is ‘ignorant’ (MMP: 27), Immanuel 
Kant ‘useless’ and ‘absurd’ (ibid.), David Hume ‘sophistical’ (MMP: 28), and 
J.S. Mill ‘stupid’ (MMP: 33). These are the philosophers she likes. The rest of 
them are something much worse: ‘consequentialists’. Anscombe coined the 
term in MMP as a pejorative, but it was quickly reclaimed as a badge of hon-
our by all its major proponents. 
It is fashionable nowadays to remark that Anscombe meant something 
rather different by ‘consequentialism’ than we do today.1 Yet her own charac-
terisation of it as the view that the “right” action is that which produces the 
1. See, for example, Diamond (1997), Teichmann (2008: 86), and Wiseman (2017: 18).
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best possible consequences (MMP: 33; quoted below) is one endorsed by most 
contemporary consequentialists.2 The exegetical difficulty arises because Ans-
combe protects the utilitarian Mill from this particular charge yet includes 
‘objectivists’ such as her near-contemporary W. D. Ross, best known for 
defending the view that actions can be wrong in virtue of their intrinsic value, 
regardless of their consequences:
There is a startling change that seems to have taken place between Mill and 
Moore. Mill assumes […] that there is no question of calculating the par-
ticular consequences of an action such as murder or theft […] In Moore and 
in subsequent academic moralists of England we find it taken to be pretty 
obvious that “the right action” is the action which produces the best possible 
consequences (reckoning among consequences the intrinsic values ascribed to 
certain kinds of act by some “Objectivists”. (MMP: 33)3
This double-move is key to understanding the last of the three related 
theses that MMP famously sets out to defend. These have proven to be as hard 
to interpret as they are easy to articulate:
T1) It is not profitable for us at present [1958] to do moral philosophy; that 
should be laid aside at any rate until we have an adequate philosophy of psy-
chology, in which we are conspicuously lacking.
T2) The concepts of obligation, and duty – moral obligation and moral duty, 
that is to say – and of what is morally right and wrong, and of the moral sense 
of “ought”, ought to be jettisoned if this is psychologically possible; because 
they are survivals, or derivatives from survivals, from an earlier conception of 
ethics which no longer survives, and are only harmful without it.
T3) The differences between the well-known English writers on moral philos-
ophy from Sidgwick to the present day are of little importance. (MMP: 26)4
What makes T3 true for Anscombe is that the philosophers in question 
are all ‘consequentialists’. Henry Sidgwick’s predecessor, Mill, is off the hook 
from this charge for two distinct reasons. First, he was careful (at least 
according to Anscombe) to distinguish intended from merely foreseen con-
sequences of an action. To understand how this helps to avoid ‘consequen-
tialism’, one needs the ‘adequate philosophy of psychology’ required to 
reveal the role played by intention in determining the nature of any given 
2. Cf. M. Geach (2008: xvii).
3. Entire papers could be written about the degree to which this passage offers plausible 
interpretations of either Mill or Moore. There is room for disagreement, for example, on 
whether murder and theft could ever fall under Mill’s ‘knotty points’ (Mill, 1861: 25), the 
answer depending on whether he conceives of them as being unjust by definition (discussed 
further below). 
4. Chappell (forthcoming) argues that Anscombe’s main complaint is T3 and that T1 and T2 
are ‘little more than auxiliary theses’.
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action.5 Second, Mill explicitly states that utilitarianism can never conflict with 
justice, going out of his way to explain why his philosophy is compatible 
with Christian morality in particular (Mill, 1861: 27). He thus allows that 
utilitarianism lead us to re-evaluate whether acts of stealing or kidnapping 
must always be unjust, while rejecting the consequentialist conviction that an 
unjust act could ever be permissible, let alone obligatory:
Have mankind been under a delusion in thinking that justice is a more sacred 
thing than policy, and that the latter ought only to be listened to after the 
former has been satisfied? While I dispute the pretensions of any theory which 
sets up an imaginary standard of justice not grounded on utility, I account the 
justice which is grounded on utility to be the chief part, and incomparably 
the most sacred and binding part, of all morality. Justice is a name for certain 
classes of moral rules which concern the essentials of human well-being more 
nearly, and are therefore of more absolute obligation, than any other rules 
for the guidance of life […] to save a life, it may not only be allowable, but a 
duty, to steal or take by force the necessary food or medicine, or to kidnap and 
compel to officiate the only qualified medical practitioner. In such cases, as 
we do not call anything justice which is not a virtue, we usually say, not that 
justice must give way to some other moral principle, but that what is just in 
ordinary cases is, by reason of that other principle, not just in the particular 
case. By this useful accommodation of language, the character of indefeasi-
bility attributed to justice is kept up, and we are saved from the necessity of 
maintaining that there can be laudable injustice. (Mill, 1861: 57-58 & 62)
Is Mill paying mere lip service to justice here or does he take the thickness 
of the concept to entail that no plausible moral theory can be at odds with it? 
In not counting him as a ‘consequentialist’, Anscombe charitably opts for the 
latter understanding viz. that he would give no weight to unjust actions, no 
matter what their effects:
Mill assumes, as we saw [27], that there is no question of calculating particular 
consequences of an action such as murder or theft. (MMP: 33)
Yet Mill’s view ultimately seems to be that any action prescribed by utili-
tarianism must be just by definition. If so, Anscombe would be wrong in her 
assessment that ‘it did not occur to him that acts of murder and theft could 
be otherwise described’ (MMP: 27). Indeed, we may plausibly attribute to 
Mill the view that some thefts are just precisely because they can be described 
as the taking of necessary food or medicine. On this point, the difference 
between Mill and someone like Aquinas is more semantic than it is moral. 
Unlike Mill, Aquinas maintains that all theft is unjust, but he also asserts that 
in cases of dire emergency it is not theft to take from another’s possessions: 
5. This is partly because Anscombe primarily conceives of ‘consequentialism’ as a view regard-
ing the sphere of personal responsibility (see Frey, 2019: 10-12). For more on Mill’s 
anti-consequentialist utilitarianism see Vogler (2001).
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When a person is in extreme need of material things, and there is no way of 
emerging from his extremity but by taking what belongs to another, the sur-
plus which another possesses becomes common property, and the taker is not 
guilty of theft. (ST, IIaIIae.66.7) 6
Anscombe’s evaluation of Mill contrasts starkly with that of Ross, accord-
ing to whom any ‘intrinsic’ property of action, including her take on being 
unjust, may in principle be outweighed by sufficiently positive consequences:
Oxford Objectivists of course distinguish between ‘consequences’ and ‘intrin-
sic values’ and so produce a misleading appearance of not being consequen-
tialists. But they do not hold – and Ross explicitly denies – that the gravity 
of, e.g., procuring the condemnation of the innocent is such that it cannot 
be outweighed by, e.g., national interest. Hence their distinction is of no 
importance. (MMP: 33, f.n. 4.)
So understood, Ross allows that there are times when, all things considered, 
we are not only permitted but morally obliged to commit acts of murder, adul-
tery, or whatever. Anscombe rejects his thesis that there is no value so sacred 
that it cannot in principle be trumped by the greater good as being ‘consequen-
tialist’, despite the fact that Ross explicitly allows that this good may itself be 
outweighed by concerns of justice or honesty. As Christopher Coope has 
argued, she would have also rejected some of Hursthouse’s views on the same 
grounds.7 Despite her own definition, then, Anscombe cannot ultimately view 
‘consequentialism’ as the simple equation of ‘rightness’ with producing the best 
consequences. As Mary Geach puts it, one might hold the ‘consequentialist’ 
view that ‘there is no act so bad [that] it might on occasion be justified by its 
consequences’ while rejecting the consequentialist view that ‘the right action is 
always that which produces the best consequences’ (M. Geach, 2008: xvii). 
In his 1956 article ‘Good and Evil’, Peter Geach denounces Ross’ moral 
outlook for very similar reasons. I quote at some length:
I am deliberately ignoring the supposed distinction between the Right and 
the Good […] Aquinas […] finds it sufficient to talk of good and bad human 
acts. When Ross would say that there is a morally good action but not a right 
act, Aquinas would say that a good human intention had issued in what was, 
in fact, a bad action; and when Ross would say that there was a right act but 
not a morally good action, Aquinas would say that there was a bad human act 
performed in circumstances in which a similar act with a different intention 
would have been a good one (e.g. giving money to a beggar for the praise of 
men rather than for the relief of his misery) […] [P]eople who think that doing 
right is something other than doing good will regard virtuous behaviour as 
consisting, not just in doing good and eschewing evil, but in doing, on every 
occasion, the right act for the occasion. This speciously strict doctrine leads in 
6. I owe this reference to Sophie-Grace Chappell.
7. Coope (2006: 46 ff.) Whilst I agree with Coope on this point, I don’t share the conception 
of justice he uses to frame it.
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fact to quite laxist consequences. A man […] if he knows that adultery is an 
evil act, will decide that (as Aristotle says) there can be no deliberating when or 
how or with whom to commit adultery. But a man who believes in discerning, 
on each occasion, the right act for the occasion, may well decide that on this 
occasion, all things considered, adultery is the right action. Sir David Ross 
explicitly tells us that on occasion the right act may be the judicial punishment 
of an innocent man “that the whole nation perish not” for in this case “the 
prima facie duty of consulting the general interest has proved more obligatory 
than the perfectly distinct prima facie duty of respecting the rights of those who 
have respected the rights of others.” (P. Geach, 1956: 41-42)8
Geach’s outing of Ross as a crypto-consequentialist is, directly linked to 
T3.9 His further rejection of Ross’ distinction between goodness and rightness 
is closely tied to Anscombe’s other two theses. In particular, Geach’s contention 
that we should make do without the concept of a ‘right action’ at all helps to 
explain why Anscombe keeps “the right action” within scare quotes. It also 
sheds light on her middle thesis (T2) that we must try to jettison the concept 
of a distinctly moral obligation. Terms like ‘moral obligation’ and ‘morally 
right action’ ought to be jettisoned because they are survivals of an earlier, 
quasi-legal conception of morality, and make no sense outside of the related 
contexts and practices that originally gave them meaning. This is not a rejec-
tion of morality, nor even of a moral ought, but only of the distinctively secu-
lar and mesmeric ‘moral ought’ that has been detached from the aforemen-
tioned conceptions.10
James Doyle (2018) has recently offered a more radical reading of T2. 
According to Doyle, Anscombe’s claim is that the term ‘moral’ as ordinarily 
used is literally meaningless, standing for an empty pseudo-concept that pro-
vokes a certain feeling in us but has no content whatsoever.11 Divine com-
 8. To this he sneeringly adds: ‘We must charitably hope that for him the words of Caiaphas 
that he quotes just had the vaguely hallowed associations of a Bible text, and that he did 
not remember whose judicial murder was being counselled.’
 9. Geach and Anscombe would presumably be equally hostile to the moral particularist claim 
that there are no principles concerning right action (e.g. Dancy, 2004). But particularism 
at the level of things done may be combined with generalism at the level of character traits 
(Sandis, 2020, 2021; cf. Swanton, 2015). Were Anscombe open to a conceptual distinction 
between doings and things done (see § III) she could more easily allow for such a view, 
whose origins lie with Aristotle’s thought that the mean is grasped through perception and 
not by reasoning (EN 1109b; but see Price, 2005).
10. Cf. Solomon (2008: 114) and Gremaschi (2017), the latter finding Anscombe’s concerns 
more parochial than the former.
11. Cf. Richter (2019). Doyle has since revised his view, but still maintains that Anscombe 
thought – and was right to think – that nothing could count as understanding the word 
‘moral’ (Doyle, 2019). This goes against the more natural reading of Anscombe’s qua-
si-Nietzschean genealogy as having been at least partly motivated by Wittgenstein’s thought 
that the meaning of any given term or expression is dependent upon the practices that give 
it life (see Sandis, 2019a; cf. Frey, 2018). Wittgenstein’s influence on Anscombe’s under-
standing of normativity is further made evident in her discussions of forcing and stopping 
modals (Anscombe, 1969, 1978a, 1978b).
Modern Moral Philosophy Before and After Anscombe Enrahonar 64, 2020  45
mands, on this understanding, neither describe nor create distinctly moral 
obligations, but only religious ones. Whatever the merits of the view itself 
(Doyle finds it more plausible than I do), we should be wary of it as an inter-
pretation of what is going on in MMP, not least because there are plenty of 
later writings in which Anscombe endorses law conceptions of morality with 
no sign of having had the slightest change of mind.
In ‘Authority in Morals’ (1962), Anscombe speaks of ‘moral conclusions’, 
‘revelation of moral belief ’, of a ‘moral truth’ concerning ‘what kinds of thing 
ought to be done and ought not to be done’ as well as of ‘the moral law’ as a 
‘range’ and of taking one’s morality from someone else, concluding that ‘the 
content of moral law, i.e., the actions which are good and just, is not essential-
ly a matter of revelation’. Similarly, in ‘The Moral Environment of the Child’, 
she states that ‘Catholic Christianity teaches a strict moral code’ and speaks, 
without scepticism, of ‘truth in the moral code’ and ‘our morality’ (231). This 
Christian morality is contrasted with ‘a morality which consisted solely of 
absolute prohibitions on fairly definitely described actions’ (presumably 
Kant’s). 
The idea of two contrasting moralities forms the core of Anscombe’s short 
essay ‘Morality’ (1982), in which she explicitly rejects the thought that there 
is such a thing as morality, not because she is a sceptic about moral concepts 
– she writes that ‘human beings have always had morality’ and talks of ‘that 
part of morality which is associated with duties to God’ (113) – but because 
she finds Christian morality so distinct from the consequentialist one that they 
amount to two entirely different moralities: one that prohibits murder, and 
one that not only permits – but can even demand – it. 
As Mary Geach writes in a 2005 letter to the Times Literary Supplement,12 
Anscombe herself, of course, had no intention of jettisoning the concepts of 
moral obligation and duty, which are needed to frame her other principal 
claim, which is that certain things are forbidden, whatever the consequences.’ 
While Christian morality does indeed require us to embody certain virtues, 
the question of which virtues we ought to have may also be addressed from the 
point of view of what is good for us, qua human. In pointing this out, Ans-
combe is in no way abandoning deontic terminology in favour of the aretaic 
(see Coope, 2006: 22). The deontic and the aretaic are simply two different 
frameworks for talking about the very same goodness. By returning to Aris-
totle’s talk of human excellence and virtue, MMP thus seeks to find a common 
language through which religious and secular thinkers alike (including Ans-
combe and her friend Philippa Foot13) may converse about morality, and 
perhaps even reach agreement.14 
12. M. Geach (2005a; see also 2005b).
13. Indeed, MMP is based on lectures Anscombe gave the previous year in Oxford, at Foot’s 
request (see M. Geach, 2008: vii).
14. Anscombe became increasingly pessimistic about the latter happening on any kind of wide 
scale (see essays in Anscombe, 2005). Jennifer Frey informs me that Aquinas was far more 
sanguine on this front.
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2. Moral Philosophy Since 1958
Anscombe’s first thesis in MMP is that ‘[i]t is not profitable for us at present 
[1958] to do moral philosophy; that should be laid aside at any rate until we 
have an adequate philosophy of psychology, in which we are conspicuously 
lacking’ (MMP: 26). By ‘philosophy of psychology’, she is not referring to the 
philosophy of cognitive science that currently goes under that name today,15 
nor to the philosophy of mind that used to share it,16 but to an investigation 
into the concepts of action, character, intention, motive, desire, pleasure, and 
the relations between them:17
In present-day philosophy an explanation is required how an unjust man is 
a bad man, or an unjust action a bad one […] it cannot even be begun until 
we are equipped with a sound philosophy of psychology […] This part of the 
subject matter of ethics is, however, completely closed to us until we18 have 
an account of what type of characteristic a virtue is - a problem, not of ethics, 
but of conceptual analysis - and how it relates to the action in which it is 
instanced […] For this we certainly need an account at least of what a human 
action is at all, and how its description as “doing such-and-such” is affected 
by its motive and by the intention or intentions in it; and for this an account 
of such concepts is required. (MMP: 29)19
The blueprint for this philosophy of action had already been laid down by 
her the year before, in her masterpiece Intention. This book had already made 
good on MMP’s request for ‘an account at least of what a human action is at 
all, and how its description as “doing such-and-such” is affected by its motive 
and by the intention or intentions in it’ (MMP: 29).20 Whether Anscombe 
herself thought she has already provided an adequate philosophy of psychol-
ogy, or merely a sketch of one, is a moot point. 
The term ‘philosophy of psychology’ has since been hijacked by philoso-
phers of cognitive science to describe what they do, leaving ‘philosophical 
psychology’ as the term of choice for those still interested in asking philosoph-
15. See, for example, Botterill and Caruthers (1999), Bermúdez (2005), Thagard (2007), and 
Weiskopf and Adams (2015).
16. For example, Block (1980).
17. Such investigations may be found across the entire history of modern moral philosophy 
(see essays in Sandis, 2019c). The most important discussions of them since Aquinas’ 
Treatise on Human Acts (ST I–II,1–21) are to be found under the ‘Morality’ heading of 
Hegel’s Philosophy of Right (PR, §§ 105-141). For comparisons between Hegel and Ans-
combe see Taylor (1979 & 1983), Quante (1993), and Sandis (2010). For Aquinas and 
Anscombe, see Jensen (2010); cf. Boulter (2009).
18. See Sandis (2019b).
19. Anscombe’s contention here remains unaffected by John Rawls’ famous argument for the 
independence of moral theory from the sorts of issues he associates with epistemology and 
the philosophy of mind and language (Rawls, 1975). But even if Rawls’ argument could 
be extended to show that many issues in moral theory are independent from philosophical 
psychology, we should not expect a theory of right action to remain silent on the relation 
of action to motive, intention, and consequence.
20. For an excellent account, see Wiseman (2016a: Ch. 2 & 2016b: § 3).
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ical questions about human psychology, and ‘moral psychology’ and ‘philoso-
phy of action’ for the areas covering the kinds of issues that Anscombe is 
referring to. Indeed, both these fields owe part of their existence as we know 
it to Anscombe. In the aftermath of Intention and MMP, the ‘philosophy of 
action’ developed into a subject in its own right, albeit more closely associated 
with the philosophy of mind than with ethics.21 Such branching-off comes at 
a heavy price, for ethics without philosophy of action is blind, and philosophy 
of action without ethics empty. 
The philosophy of mind and action during the past sixty years has thus 
developed alongside that of normative ethics, with very little interaction 
between them. This has enabled philosophers to defend theories of ‘right 
action’ while remaining conspicuously silent about what actions are, or how 
to best conceive of their relation to intentions (on the one hand) and conse-
quences (on the other). As a result of all this, contemporary moral philosophy 
is now neatly divided into the following four branches, which had yet to 
properly separate in 1958:
a) Meta-ethics
b) Normative Ethics (‘moral theory’)
c) Practical or ‘applied’ ethics
d) Moral Psychology
To be sure, theorists debate the extent to which views within (a-d) are 
interrelated, but they are generally content to teach them as separate ‘modules’ 
and have been known to profess expertise in any one of the above while claim-
ing near-ignorance on the remaining three. People do, of course, defend phil-
osophical positions according to which one cannot do (c) without (b) and/or 
(b) without (a), but even these are parasitic on the divisions in question. Most 
importantly, (d) is typically reserved for questions relating to agency, motiva-
tion, moral responsibility, akrasia, etc. that are thought to be largely independ-
ent of (a-c). In complete opposition to all this, MMP’s first thesis effectively 
tells us that one cannot do (a-c) at all without first doing (d). While Anscombe 
certainly cared for ‘practical’ issues relating to everyday life as well as to med-
ical, military, and legal policies, she did not see these as separable from either 
moral philosophy or the philosophy of psychology.22 
I shan’t concern myself much with (a) and (c), save to recall that the con-
temporary obsession of engaging in (c) of comparing intuitions about increas-
ingly absurd trolley-cases is an unintended consequence of an argument made 
by Foot in which she defends, against Hare’s consequentialism, an original 
combination of the doctrine of double effect and the doctrine of doing and 
21. For a brief period, philosophy of mind was also called ‘philosophy of psychology’ (see, for 
example, Block, 1980).
22. This is evident across all her work in ethics, but particularly so in Anscombe (1957b; for 
which, see Wiseman 2016b).
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allowing.23 Anscombe would have been much more horrified by much of what 
falls under either of these ‘branches’ today than by anything she was objecting 
to in 1958. Hardly any of it can be attributed as an effect of MMP though. As 
this is not the case with (2) and (4), I shall focus on these. I begin with some 
paradigmatic mainstream positions within normative ethics or ‘moral theory’:
Act consequentialism is the claim that an act is morally right if and only if that 
act maximizes the good. (Sinnott-Armstrong, 2015)
An act is wrong if and only if it is forbidden by the code of rules whose 
internalization by the overwhelming majority of everyone everywhere in each 
new generation has maximum expected value in terms of well-being. (Hooker, 
2002: 32)
[A]n act is wrong if it would be disallowed by any principle that no one could 
reasonably respect. (Scanlon, 1998: 197)
An action is right iff it is what a virtuous agent would characteristically do in 
the circumstances. (Hursthouse, 1999: 17, see also 28-29)
An act is wrong just when such acts are disallowed by the principles that are 
optimific, uniquely universally willable, and not reasonably rejectable. (Parfit, 
2011: 413)24
What makes an action morally right is that it originates in a person’s good 
will. (Sullivan, 1989: 117)
[D]eontologists think that acts are wrong because of the sorts of acts they 
are. (Davis, 1991: 210)25
It’s hardly news that Anscombe would be particularly hostile to consequen-
tialist theories, whose current division into several sub-species (act and rule 
focusing on actual, probable, expected, or intended consequences) has partly 
resulted as a response to some of Anscombe’s arguments in MMP and else-
where. But what about deontology and virtue ethics? Surely, as a believer in 
Divine Command Theory and the view that some actions are absolutely pro-
23. Foot (1967: 23 ff.); for more context see Hacker-Wright (2013: 107-109) and Coope 
(2015). Anscombe anticipates and rejects a crucial component of trolley reasoning in 
MMP: 40. Sixty years later, philosophy’s most prominent appearance in popular culture is 
in the trolley-obsessed The Good Place, in which one of central characters (Chidi Anagonye) 
is a ‘Professor of Ethics and Moral Philosophy’. The droll conjunction reminds me of the 
first time I taught ‘Ethics’ for Florida Institute of Technology’s study abroad programme at 
Oxford. All of the other professors introduced themselves as teaching courses ‘X’ and ‘Y’ 
to great enthusiasm from the students. But when I introduced myself as the lecturer for 
‘Moral Philosophy’, I was greeted with baffled silence, until one of the students hesitantly 
asked ‘Do you mean “Ethics”?’, to all-round relief.
24. The word ‘virtue’ cannot be found in any of the three volumes of Parfit’s On What Matters.
25. Andreas Lind has brought to my attention the fact that normative theories frequently 
conflate accounts of rightness conditions with accounts of right/wrong-making. 
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hibited, Anscombe could have no problem with deontology? And was MMP 
not striving towards a kind of virtue ethics? My answers to both these ques-
tions are negative. 
To begin with, what all of the above theories are doing viz. attempting to 
provide accounts of ‘the right action’ is problematic, for two reasons. First, as 
we have already seen (§ I), Anscombe follows Geach in being troubled by the 
very notion of an action being morally right or wrong, as opposed to good or 
bad. This worry relates to the larger question of what is meant by ‘action’ in 
the first place. Robert M. Adams expresses a commonplace certainty when we 
writes that ‘[w]hat every competent user of “wrong” must know about wrong-
ness is, first of all, that wrongness is a property of actions (perhaps also of 
intentions and various attitudes, but certainly of actions)’ (Adams, 1979: 74). 
Accordingly, normative theorists feel licensed to remain silent on the question 
of what an action is. In fact, it is shocking just how little they are prepared to 
say on this topic. 
The optimistic assumption is that one can simply ‘plug in’ one’s favourite 
account of action, without this affecting the plausibility of the theory in ques-
tion, let alone what it would even mean for an action to be right.26 One 
explanation for this might be that there is nothing to puzzle over here. As H.A. 
Prichard notes:
The question ‘What is acting or doing something?’ seems at first unreal, i.e. a 
question to which we already know the answer. For it looks as though everyone 
knows what doing something is and would be ready to offer instances. No one, 
for instance, would hesitate to say to another ‘You ought to go to bed’, on the 
ground that neither he nor the other knows the kind of thing meant by ‘going 
to bed’. Yet, when we consider instances that would be offered, we do not find 
it easy to state the common character which we think they had which led us 
to call them actions. (Prichard, 1945: 272)
On occasion, a moral theorist may say something about whether they take 
actions to be events, or whether they are talking of act ‘types’ or ‘tokens’.27 By 
and large, however, one finds little conceptual exploration of the relation 
between motive, intention, action, and consequence, save perhaps on ques-
tions of merely adjacent interest to the main event, such as the ‘doctrine of 
double effect’ or ‘the doctrine of doing and allowing’.
In the second half of the 20th century, the prevailing view of actions was 
Davidson’s (Anscombe-inspired) contention that they are a sub-set of events.28 
Yet hardly anyone seems to care about what it might mean for an event to be 
right or wrong (morally or otherwise) or, for that matter, morally good or 
26. See Sandis (2017). Schapiro (2001 & 2021) and Hurley (2018) also argue that different 
conceptions of action render competing normative views plausible, but what they really have 
in mind are different theories of agency.
27. Cf. Wetzel (2006: § 2.2) and Hanser (2008). 
28. Davidson (1963).
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bad.29 Proponents of all sides share a related tendency to draw a hard distinc-
tion between the deontic and the evaluative, focusing their interest in action 
on its rightness or wrongness, and reserving terms like ‘good’ and ‘bad’ for its 
motives and/or consequences. From this big leap, it is but a small step to the 
conclusion that that normative ethics is in the business of providing deontic 
accounts, leaving evaluative concerns to the ‘branch’ that is moral psycholo-
gy.30 Anyone who insists otherwise is branded a virtue-ethicist.
Should we not at least rejoice in the post-MMP ‘the revival of virtue eth-
ics’?31 For some the writing was on the wall from the outset:
[W]hen the phrase ‘virtue ethics’ first came on the scene a number of people, 
I suspect, must have had a certain sinking feeling – without perhaps quite 
realizing why. The thing, we supposed, was almost bound to go to the bad. 
This gloomy assessment has I think proved quite realistic. (Coope, 2006: 20)
Anscombe argued that a philosophical concern with virtue should perme-
ate moral philosophy. Instead, it has led to just one more theory, competing 
with deontology, consequentialism, and contractualism to provide the best 
account of right and wrong action.32 Julia Annas laments:
Doing the right thing turns out not to be so central in an ethics in which 
virtue is central. A virtue ethical theory will be interested in virtuous action, 
but will not get much out of the notion of right action. (Annas, 2011: 47)
No one has done more than Rosalind Hursthouse to put forward virtue 
ethics on the map as ‘a genuine rival to utilitarianism and deontology’ which 
can ‘give an account of right action in such a way as to provide action guid-
ance’ (Hursthouse, 1999: 26 & 28; see also Hursthouse, 1996). While she 
does well to emphasise the guiding power of being concerned with virtue, the 
offering of a normative theory of right action could not be further removed 
from what Anscombe was hoping to achieve with MMP.33 This may serve to 
explain Hursthouse’s ambivalence towards this aspect of her own work. While 
she boasts that virtue ethics ‘is at least a possible rival to deontological and util-
itarian theories’ – one that ‘can come up with an account of ’ right action, – she 
tellingly adds that it only does this ‘under pressure, only in order to maintain 
a fruitful dialogue with the overwhelming majority of modern philosophers 
for whom “right action” is the natural phrase’ (Hursthouse, 1999: 223 & 69; 
cf. Swanton, 2003: 245).34 It’s as if the wimpy school nerd feels reassured to 
29. By contrast, we know what it is for an event to be good or bad tout court viz. to have pos-
itive or negative value.
30. Consequentialism and other mainstream normative theories involve the promotion of good-
ness (see Korsgaard, 1993), while virtue ethics sees goodness as a (not necessarily causal) 
mark of right action, but neither approach offers accounts of good action.
31. See Baril and Hazlett (2019).
32. Cf. Solomon (1988 & 2003) and Coope (2015).
33. The point is put forth with a panoply of arguments by Coope (2006: 26-39).
34. Cf. Annas (2011: 47, f.n. 36). 
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have finally been accepted by those big nasty bullies, experiencing just a shade 
of residual resentment.
Virtue ethics thus solidifies itself as simply one more position within moral 
theory, offering an account of right action in terms of what the virtuous agent 
would characteristically do in the circumstances. Such theories allow one to 
ask whether virtue ethics and consequentialism might be compatible. It is, 
after all, conceivable that the virtuous person is one disposed to perform 
whichever actions are expected to promote the greatest amount of good.35 If 
this is what constitutes moral philosophy then Anscombe is not making a 
move within it. Her morality is not in direct competition with other normative 
theories, because it isn’t in the business of producing a theory of right action at 
all. Needless to say, this does not imply that Anscombe’s account of action and 
intention is neutral with regard to all such theories. Far from it.
So much for moral philosophy after Intention and MMP. Before these 
interventions, British moral theorists were, ironically, less inclined to separate 
their defence of any particular account of ‘right action’ from their views in 
moral and philosophical psychology.
3. Moral Philosophy Before 1957
There was considerably more philosophy of action and psychology within 
20th century moral theory before 1957, than there has been ever since. Curi-
ously, much of it was conducted by a number of Anscombe’s explicit or implic-
it targets (including Moore, 1903; Ross, 1930; Ewing, 1938; Macmurray, 
1938; Prichard, 1945), though it is present across the entire history of modern 
moral philosophy.36 In this final section I highlight some of their insights, with 
a central focus on the much maligned W. D. Ross (see § I), who was among 
other things an Aristotle scholar and a translator of the Nicomachean Ethics.
Ross defends the proto-Anscombean view that ‘any act may be correctly 
described in an indefinite, and in principle infinite, number of ways’ and that 
what I do could, for instance, be truthfully described as ‘fulfilling my promise’, 
‘putting the book into our friend’s possession’, and ‘the packing and posting 
of a book’:
35. See M. Geach (2008: xvii-xviii). Roger Crisp has argued for a ‘Utilitarianism of the Virtues’ 
according to which the virtuous agent lives ‘in such a way that the total amount of utility 
in the history of the world is brought as close as possible to the maximum.’ (Crisp, 1992: 
154; cf. Hursthouse, 1999: 5 & 7-8). More recently, Crisp has defended the additional 
view that if we understand virtue ethics as providing an account of right and wrong action 
(as Hursthouse does), then it collapses into a form of deontology. He suggests, further, that 
this can be avoided by focusing on the question of the value of virtue, as opposed to the 
notion of right action (Crisp, 2015 & 2019: 142-145; cf. Baron, 1997 and Singleton, 
1999). Anscombe’s insight, by contrast, is that we cannot even begin to answer questions 
concerning right action without understanding what it is to act virtuously. It would be a 
mistake, however, to attempt to transform such an understanding into a normative theory.
36. See note 17.
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[A]ny of the acts we do has countless effects […] Every act therefore, viewed 
in some aspects, will be prima facie right, and viewed in others prima facie 
wrong. […] any act may be correctly described in an indefinite, and in prin-
ciple infinite, number of ways. An act is the production of a change in the 
state of affairs […]I may have promised, for instance, to return a book to a 
friend […] to send it by a messenger or to hand it to his servant or to send it 
by post… in each of these cases what I do directly is worthless in itself […] this 
is not what we should describe, strictly, as our duty; our duty is to fulfil our 
promise, i.e. to put the book into our friend’s possession […] What I do is as 
truly describable in this way as by saying that it is the packing and posting of a 
book […] And if we ask ourselves whether it is right qua the packing or post-
ing of a book, or qua the securing of my friend’s getting what I have promised 
to return to him, it is clear that it is in the second capacity that it is right […] 
by its own nature and not because of its consequences. (Ross, 1930: 41-4)37
Reading the above, I can’t help thinking that far from dismissing Ross’ 
moral philosophy Anscombe was heavily influenced by it. Indeed, she would 
later even apply the same preposition (‘qua’) to distinguish her view that 
actions may be intentional under a description from the nonsensical claim 
that actions-under-a-description are intentional (Anscombe, 1979). So why 
did Anscombe reject Ross’ work in such strong terms? His ‘objectivism’ may 
have lapsed into a form of ‘consequentialism’ so anathema to Christian moral-
ity (see § I) that she didn’t want to debate its details under the guise of doing 
‘moral philosophy’,38 but this is not in itself a reason to dismiss an entire 
method of doing moral philosophy that is uncannily similar to her own. A 
clue to the riddle may be found in an earlier passage of The Right and the Good. 
Ross writes:
[G]reat confusion […] has been introduced into ethics by the phrase ‘a right 
action’ being used sometimes of the initiation of a certain change in the state 
of affairs irrespective of motive, and at other times of such initiation from some 
particular motive, such as sense of duty or benevolence. I would further suggest 
that additional clearness would be gained if we used ‘act’ of the thing done, the 
initiation of change, and ‘action’ of the doing of it, the initiating of change, 
from a certain motive. We should then talk of a right act but not of a right 
action, of a morally good action but not of a morally good act. And it may be 
added that the doing of a wrong act may be a morally good action; for ‘right’ 
and ‘wrong’ refer entirely to the thing done, ‘morally good’ and ‘morally bad’ 
entirely to the motive from which it is done. (Ross, 1930: 6-7; cf. Sidgwick, 
1874: Book III, Ch. 12 and Macmurray, 1938)
37. Compare: ‘The only events to consider are intentional actions themselves, and to call an 
action intentional is to say it is intentional under some description that we give (or could 
give) of it […] there is no distinction between my doing and the thing’s happening’ (Ans-
combe, 1957a: §§ 19 & 29).
38. Cf. Wiseman (2016b: 10-11).
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From all this he concludes, in a deliberately provocative and paradoxical 
manner: 
[N]othing that ought to be done is ever morally good […] the only acts that 
are morally good are those that proceed from a good motive […] action from 
a good motive is never morally obligatory […] what is morally good is never 
right […] That action from a good motive is never obligatory follows from the 
Kantian principle […] that ‘I ought’ implies ‘I can’. […] however carelessly 
I pack or dispatch the book, if it comes to hand I have done my duty, and 
however carefully I acted, if the book does not come to hand I have not done 
my duty. Of course I should deserve more praise in the second case than in 
the first. (Ross, 1930: 132)
Anscombe has little time for this sort of distinction between what is done 
and the doing of it from a certain motive. She is consequently disinclined to 
relate the former to the right and the latter to the good, a disposition 
strengthened by her independent suspicion of the very distinction between 
good and right action (see § I). It is worth recalling, at this juncture, that her 
objection was not that moral philosophers lack a philosophy of psychology 
or action per se, only that they are in desperate need of one that was ‘sound’, or 
at least ‘adequate’.
So perhaps Anscombe simply found Ross’ argument to the conclusion that 
an action that is good can never be right (and vice versa) to be ‘unsound’ 
because it fails to capture the correct relation between motive, intention, 
action, and duty. Whatever the explanation, she seems to have thrown the baby 
out with the bathwater. For there is a sound and morally important difference 
to be made between the things we do and our doings of them, especially in 
relation to questions concerning intention, foresight, consequences, and 
intrinsic wrongness.39
Ross’s point about the rightness of an action being divorceable from the 
goodness or badness of one’s performing it is a sensible and important one, 
sharing affinities with Mill’s stance that ‘a right action does not necessarily 
indicate a virtuous character’ and that ‘actions which are blameable often 
proceed from qualities entitled to praise’. (Mill, 1863: 18-20).40 Yet Ans-
combe’s view that the things we do are physical happenings or events (1957a, 
§ 29, 1964: 4, 1969: 10-11, 1979: 208-210) with morally pertinent descrip-
tions41 seems to leave no space for it. This is because it rules out the possibil-
ity that two people can do the very same thing, even though only of them is 
acting from a good motive.42 In this she goes against her teacher, Wittgenstein, 
39. See Hornsby (1993).
40. For contrast see Kant (1788: 5, 147-148).
41. See note 37.
42. Strictly speaking, one could defend an identity theory between action-event and thing done 
while allowing for the subtler distinction between one’s doing X from and event of one’s 
doing X from (see Sandis, 2012: 33), but the stance would be eccentric. 
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who cites this very possibility as an explanation for why self-understanding 
can be so difficult to achieve at times:
It is hard to understand yourself properly since something that you might be 
doing out of generosity & goodness is the same as you may be doing out of 
cowardice or indifference. To be sure, one may act in such & such a way from 
true love, but also from deceitfulness & from a cold heart too (CV p. 54 [MS 
131 38: 14.8.1946]; cf. PI, §§ 253-254).
One may be tempted to object here that ‘A did the same thing as B’ simply 
amounts to there being some description of what A did which is also true of 
what B did (e.g. ‘give money to X’, or ‘show off to his friends’). But it would 
be a category mistake to think that such descriptions apply to things done, as 
opposed to our doings of them. If A murdered X then we can indeed describe 
this very thing that A did by saying (with some loss in specificity) that A killed 
X, for the latter is a sub-set of the former. But if A gave money to X, we cannot 
truthfully describe the thing done (give money) as showing off, since one can 
do this very same thing without even intending to showing off in the process. 
For sure, a particular instance of giving money may be truthfully describ-
able as showing off, but the things we do, in the sense in which two people 
can do the same thing, are not instances of anything. If the case of the person 
whose donating a large sum of money is a case of showing off, then there is 
not one single thing done that is good under one description and bad under 
another but, rather, one event of someone acting badly in doing two distinct 
things (one right, the other wrong). Hursthouse writes:
[A]ct honestly, charitably, generously; do not act dishonestly, etc. […] the 
adverbs connote not only doing what the virtuous agent would do, but also 
doing it ‘in the way’ she would do it, which includes ‘for the same sort(s) of 
reason(s)’43 […] What is misleading about this phrase is that it obscures the 
fact that, in one way, the agent is not ‘doing the right thing’. What she is 
doing is, say, trying to impress the onlookers, or hurting someone’s feelings, 
or avoiding punishment. (Hursthouse, 1999: 29, f.n. 7 & 125) 
But while one’s act of donating to charity may also be correctly described 
as one’s trying to impress the onlookers, this doesn’t give us a reason to deny 
that in so acting a person may do (at least) two things: donate to charity and 
impress the onlookers, one of which is right and the other wrong. Anscombe 
can, of course, allow that one can donate to charity with the (bad) intention 
of impressing the onlookers. On her view, however, this provides a true 
description of what was done, thereby leaving no space for the view that one 
can do the right thing with a bad intention. This forces her to say that what 
was done was right under one description and wrong under another.
43. One may also act in right or wrong ways that are independent of morality (there are two 
senses in which one might being a good thief ).
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Anscombe’s underlying account of action as a happening contrasts with 
that of Prichard, according to whom to do something is to bring about a 
change: 
It is, no doubt, not easy to say what we mean by ‘an action’ or by ‘doing 
something’. Yet we have in the end to allow that we mean by it originating, 
causing, or bringing about the existence of something viz. some new state of 
an existing thing or substance, or, more shortly, causing a change of state 
of some existing things […] by ‘moving our hand’ we mean causing a change of 
place in our hand; by ‘posting a letter’ we mean bringing about that a letter is 
in a pillar-box. (Prichard, 1932: 84-85)
The view outlined above anticipates those of G. H. von Wright (1963) 
and, more recently, Maria Alvarez and John Hyman (1998). By the end of 
World War II, however, Prichard had come to embrace a volitionist account 
of action as a form of mental activity (1945: 272-274).44 Contra Macmurray 
and Ross, he would claim that the term ‘action’ was not ambiguous at all: it 
referred to our mental ‘doings’ and not to their effected changes, which con-
stitute our ‘deeds’ (ibid.: 275; cf. von Wright 1963: 37 ff.).
Anscombe would have undoubtedly rejected Prichard’s invalid inference 
from the thought that we might conceivably fail to achieve anything we set 
out to do, to the conclusion that all we ever have a duty to do is to set our-
selves (viz. will) to bring something about. Indeed, no adequate philosophy of 
psychology could ever allow for such an inference. But if, in uttering ‘I do 
what happens’, Anscombe had been running a million miles from Prichard’s 
volitionism, then she ended up too far in the other direction.
Epilogue
Sixty years after MMP, contemporary moral philosophy is replete with conse-
quentialist thinking obsessed with trolley-cases, a re-branded ‘philosophy of 
psychology’ that replaces conceptual explorations with unrefined findings from 
cognitive science, an experimental form of ‘moral psychology’ that culminates 
in the situationist skepticism about character traits, and the espousal of virtue 
ethics as a theory of ‘morally right action’ that may even be compatible with 
utilitarianism. By Anscombe’s lights, moral philosophy would seem to have 
been in far better shape between Moore and MMP than it is now. Within the 
work of Ross and Prichard alone, we find a properly philosophical psychology 
(one that includes conceptual explorations of the relation of action to motive, 
intention, and the will) to be central to moral thought. 
Whatever one’s assessment of the views of action that Anscombe sought 
to combat and the account that she put forward in their place, MMP seems to 
have inadvertently created a wedge between ethics and action theory. This has 
44. The general shape of Prichard’s account is retained in the early work of Jennifer Hornsby, 
who replaces willing with trying (1980: 46-48, 60-63; retracted in Hornsby, 2010).
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largely been the result of two consequences that Anscombe could not have 
easily foreseen, and most certainly didn’t intend. The first is the establishment 
of ‘virtue ethics’ as one more position within normative ethics, theorizing that 
an action is right if (and only if ) it is what the virtuous agent would (advise 
us to) do. The second is the development of ‘moral psychology’ as an inde-
pendent and increasingly empirical ‘branch’ of ethics whose interest in ques-
tions of motivation, agency, and responsibility have been largely sawed off 
investigations into the good and the right.
To end with a ray of hope: the 21st century has seen a resurgence of 
neo-Anscombians producing impressive work in moral philosophy (e.g. 
Coope, 2006; Solomon, 2003, 2008; Thompson, 2008; Vogler, 2009; Frey, 
2019 and Hain, 2019). This welcome revival of interest in her work is an 
opportunity for moral philosophers to work well and finally put things right.45
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